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Abstract
We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts
markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) mono-
tonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts
markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and
3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and mono-
tonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words,
the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually
rational, and implementable.
JEL classification: C62, C78, D78, J41.
Keywords: Matching with Contracts, (Maskin) Monotonicity, Nash implementation,
Stability.
1 Introduction
We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with con-
tracts markets (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). As demonstrated in Examples 1–4, the
matching with contracts model contains classical marriage markets (e.g., Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962), college admissions markets (e.g., Roth, 1985), job matching markets (e.g., Kelso
and Crawford, 1982),1 and certain auction markets (e.g., Milgrom, 2004). Throughout the
article, without loss of generality, we model a matching market with contracts as a med-
ical job market consisting of two finite and disjoint sets of agents, which we refer to as
doctors and hospitals. Furthermore, there is a set of bilateral contracts between doctors
and hospitals that specify the employment conditions (e.g., salary, job profile, retirement
plan, etc.). The agents’ strict preferences over (feasible, legal, etc.) sets of contracts or
allocations completes the description of a matching market with contracts.
In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they
produce stable allocations (e.g., Roth, 1984, 1991; Roth and Xing, 1994). Loosely speak-
ing, an allocation is “stable” if it is individually rational [each doctor (hospital) finds
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1Roth and Sotomayor (1990) give a comprehensive and complete survey of these and related two-sided
matching models up to 1990.
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the respective contract(s) acceptable] and satisfies no blocking [no hospital can block the
allocation by offering an alternative set of contracts that itself and all doctors involved
in the new contracts prefer]. It is well-known that for matching markets with sufficient
substitutability instabilities can be ruled out: for one-to-one and many-to-one matching
markets without money see Gale and Shapley (1962) and Roth (1985), for many-to-one
matching markets with money see Kelso and Crawford (1982), and for many-to-many
schedule matching see Alkan and Gale (2003). For matching markets with contracts Hat-
field and Milgrom (2005) prove that substitutability of hospitals’ preferences is sufficient
to guarantee stability. In other words, if hospitals’ preferences are substitutable, then the
stable correspondence that assigns to each matching market with contracts its set of stable
matchings is well-defined.
In order to solve a matching problem and determine a stable allocation a centralized
clearinghouse would need to know all agents’ preferences. An appealing strategic property
for solutions that requires that no agent can ever benefit from misrepresenting his/her
preferences is strategy-proofness, i.e., truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for all
agents. Unfortunately, there exists no (single-valued) solution that always assigns stable
allocations (Roth, 1982). Phrased differently, stable allocations cannot be reached through
weakly dominant “truth-telling equilibria,” i.e., truth-telling is not always a weakly domi-
nant strategy for all agents in the direct revelation game. The next question that naturally
arises is whether there is another way to obtain stable allocations through strategic inter-
action, a question that is at the heart of the theory of implementation (for recent surveys
see Jackson, 2001; Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002). A mechanism consists of a collection of
strategy spaces (one for each agent) and an outcome function, which assigns to each profile
of chosen strategies a feasible allocation. Together with agents’ preferences, which are used
to evaluate such allocations, we obtain a game in strategic form. Then, to Nash implement
the stable correspondence means that the set of allocations induced by all Nash equilibria
coincides with the set of stable allocations. Note that “payoffs” in the above games are
reached in two steps: first the outcome function determines an allocation and then each
agent evaluates the allocation using individual preferences. Thus, the mechanism can be
set up independent of agents’ (true) preferences and therefore a centralized clearinghouse
would not have to have any particular information about the involved agents and their
preferences. In his seminal paper Maskin (1977, 1999) introduced a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for Nash implementability: (Maskin) monotonicity. For economies
with at least three agents, Moore and Repullo (1990) formulated necessary and sufficient
conditions for Nash implementability: monotonicity in combination with a weak no veto
power requirement (see Maskin, 1999).
For two-sided marriage and college admissions markets (Examples 1 and 2), Kara and
So¨nmez (1996, 1997) show that the stable correspondence is Nash implementable. So¨nmez
(1996) obtains a corresponding implementability result for so-called generalized matching
markets; a class of one-sided matching problems that include marriage and roommate
markets (Gale and Shapley, 1962) as well as housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
In a recent paper Ehlers (2004) obtains positive implementation results in generalized
matching markets when agents are allowed to have weak preferences. Apart from the Nash
implementability of the stable correspondence, all mentioned articles discuss stability in
relation to monotonicity, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality.
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In the present article we focus on Nash implementability of the stable correspondence
in matching markets with contracts. We show that the stable correspondence is monotonic
(Theorem 1). Moreover, any Pareto efficient, individual rational and monotonic solution
is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). The latter result implies that
the stable correspondence is the smallest possible monotonic solution (Corollary 1), which
implies that by Maskin’s fundamental result it is impossible to implement any subcorre-
spondence (e.g., single-valued) of the stable correspondence. Finally, by verifying Moore
and Repullo’s (1990) “condition µ” we prove that the stable correspondence is Nash im-
plementable in matching markets with contracts with more than two agents (Theorem 3).
Theorem 4 complements Theorem 3 by showing that the implementation of stable two
agent contracts (the two agent case) is not possible. Finally, apart from obtaining var-
ious monotonicity and implementation results concerning the stable correspondence in
matching with contracts markets, we also provide an alternative proof technique for our
Nash implementability result. All previous papers that demonstrate implementability of
the stable correspondence in various matching models (Kara and So¨nmez, 1996, 1997;
So¨nmez, 1996; Ehlers, 2004) use Yamato’s (1992) “essential monotonicity” of the stable
correspondence. We apply Moore and Repullo’s (1990) implementability condition and
show that alternatively monotonicity and a particular no veto power property of the stable
correspondence assures its implementability (see Section 4 for further details).
2 Matching Markets with Contracts and Stability
2.1 Doctors, Hospitals, and Contracts
We consider a model, in which doctors are matched to hospitals. Let D denote the finite
set of doctors, H the finite set of hospitals, and N = D ∪H the set of all agents. By d we
denote a generic doctor, by h a generic hospital, and by i, j generic agents.
To model the typical feature of a job-matching market, we assume that each doctor
can be matched to at most one hospital, whereas each hospital may be matched to several
doctors. A (bilateral) contract specifies a match between one doctor and one hospital and
further terms of employment such as, for instance, salary, working time and schedule,
social benefits, or a combination of these and additional contract terms. Formally the set
of (feasible, legal, etc.) contracts is described by a set X in connection with a mapping
µ = (µD, µH) : X −→ D ×H that specifies the bilateral structure of each contract. So,
for any contract x ∈ X, µ(x) = (d, h) means that contract x is established between doctor
d and hospital h. Note that for two contracts x, x′ ∈ X,x 6= x′, with µ(x) = µ(x′), x and
x′ specify different terms of employment for the same doctor in the same hospital.
If all hospitals offer the same set of employment specifications K to all doctors, then
the set of contracts X can be represented as a Cartesian product X = D ×H ×K. An
example of such an employment specification K would be a salary scale that by law has
to be employed by all hospitals. However, note that hospitals may not necessarily use the
same employment specification: a public hospital may not be able to offer the same salaries
and social benefits as a private clinic, but on the other hand it may offer employment in
fields of specialization that cannot be offered by a private clinic. Furthermore, not all
hospitals need to offer the same employment specifications to all doctors, for instance
because hospitals condition their employment specifications on the doctors’ qualifications.
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Also, we do not assume that µ is surjective. Thus, a doctor d might not have any contract
with some hospital h, for instance, because his field of specialization does not qualify him
for any position offered by h. For each doctor it is always possible to reject any contract,
that is to stay unemployed. We denote such a null contract by ∅. For each hospital it is
always possible to reject any set of contracts, that is to keep positions vacant. We refer to
the specific situation in which a hospital does not employ any doctors as a null contract,
denoted by ∅.
2.2 Doctors’ and Hospitals’ Preferences
For d ∈ D let Xd := µ
−1
D (d) be the set of contracts in which doctor d is matched to some
hospital. Each doctor d ∈ D has a total (linear) order over feasible contracts Xd ∪ {∅}
represented by a preference relation Rd.
2 Given x′, y′ ∈ Xd ∪ {∅}, x
′ Pd y
′ means that
doctor d strictly prefers contract x′ to contract y′; x′ Rd y
′ means that x′ Pd y
′ or x′ = y′
and that doctor d weakly prefers contract x′ to contract y′. We denote the set of all
possible total orders for doctor d by Rd. Since preference relation Rd ∈ Rd is a total
order, it induces a well-defined single-valued choice correspondence Cd : 2
X =⇒ Xd ∪ {∅}
that assigns to each set of contracts X ′ ⊆ X doctor d’s most preferred contract among
the ones available for him in X ′ ∪ {∅}, i.e., for all X ′ ⊆ X, Cd(X
′) ∈ (X ′ ∩Xd) ∪ {∅}
and for all y ∈ (X ′ ∩Xd) ∪ {∅}, y 6= Cd(X
′), it follows that Cd(X
′) Pd y. We write
CD(X
′) :=
⋃
d∈D Cd(X
′).
No hospital h is allowed to have more than one contract with a doctor at the
same time. Therefore, we define the sets of feasible contracts for hospital h by Xh :={
X ′ ⊆ µ−1H (h) | for all d ∈ D, |X
′ ∩ µ−1D (d)| ≤ 1
}
. Note that the null contract is always
feasible, i.e., ∅ ∈ Xh, and that X
′ ∈ Xh implies for all Y
′ ⊆ X ′, Y ′ ∈ Xh. Each hospital
h ∈ H has a total (linear) order over sets of feasible contracts Xh represented by a prefer-
ence relation Rh.
3 Given X ′, Y ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ Ph Y
′ means that hospital h strictly prefers the
set of contracts X ′ to the set of contacts Y ′; X ′Rh Y
′ means that X ′Ph Y
′ or X ′ = Y ′ and
that hospital h weakly prefers the set of contracts X ′ to the set of contacts Y ′. We denote
the set of all possible total orders for hospital h by Rh. Since preference relation Rh ∈ Rh
is a total order, it induces a well-defined choice correspondence Ch : 2
X =⇒ X ∪ {∅} that
assigns to each set of contracts X ′ ⊆ X hospital h’s most preferred feasible set of contracts
available for it in X ′ ∪ {∅}, i.e., for all X ′ ⊆ X, Ch(X
′) ∈ Xh, Ch(X
′) ⊆ X ′, and there is
no Y ⊆ X ′, Y ∈ Xh, with Y Ph Ch(X
′). We write CH(X
′) :=
⋃
h∈H Ch(X
′).
2.3 Matching Markets with Contracts, Allocations, and Solutions
Since the set of contracts X and the set of agents N remain fixed throughout this study,
we can denote a matching market (with contracts) by a preference profile (Ri)i∈N ≡
((Rd)d∈D, (Rh)h∈H) ∈
∏
d∈DRd ×
∏
h∈H Rh. If not otherwise specified, we denote the
associated profile of choice correspondences for R ∈ R by (Ci)i∈N . We denote the set of
all preference profiles by R =
∏
d∈D Rd ×
∏
h∈H Rh.
2In other words, Rd represents a binary relation that satisfies antisymmetry (for all x
′, y′ ∈ Xd, if
x′ Rd y
′ and y′ Rd x
′, then x′ = y′), transitivity (for all x′, y′, z′ ∈ Xd, if x
′ Rd y
′ and y′ Rd z
′, then x′ Rd z
′),
and comparability (for all x′, y′ ∈ Xd, x
′ Rd y
′ or y′ Rd x
′).
3In other words, Rh represents a binary relation that satisfies antisymmetry (for all X
′, Y ′ ∈ Xh, if
X ′ Rh Y
′ and Y ′ Rh X
′, then X ′ = Y ′), transitivity (for all X ′, Y ′, Z′ ∈ Xh, if X
′ Rh Y
′ and Y ′ Rh Z
′, then
X ′ Rh Z
′), and comparability (for all X ′, Y ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ Rh Y
′ or Y ′ Rh X
′).
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An allocation is a list A of contracts in
∏
d∈D(Xd ∪ {∅}). Denote by Ad ∈ Xd ∪ {∅}
doctor d’s contract at allocation A, i.e., either Ad = ∅ or Ad ∈ Xd is a contract between
doctor d and hospital µH(Ad). Since contracts are bilateral, allocation A = (Ad)d∈D
induces the allocation of contracts to hospitals, i.e., at allocation A hospital h offers the
set of contracts Ah :=
⋃
d∈D:µH(Ad)=h
{Ad}. With slight abuse of notation we also view A
as a subset of X, i.e., A =
⋃
d∈D Ad =
⋃
h∈H Ah. We denote the set of allocations by A.
Clearly, all preference relations Ri induce weak preferences over allocations in a natural
way. We use the same notation for preferences over feasible contracts/contract sets and
allocations: for all agents i ∈ N and allocations A,A′ ∈ A, ARiA
′ if and only if AiRi A
′
i.
A solution ϕ is a correspondence ϕ : R =⇒ A that assigns to each matching market
R a set of allocations ϕ(R). Next we discuss two basic properties for solutions: Pareto
efficiency and individual rationality.
An allocation A ∈ A is Pareto efficient for matching market R ∈ R if there is no
other allocation A′ ∈ A such that for all i ∈ N , A′ Ri A and for some j ∈ N , A
′ Pj A.
Alternatively, using the profile of choice correspondences associated with R, A is Pareto
efficient if there is no allocation A′ 6= A such that for all i ∈ N , Ci(A ∪ A
′) = A′i. A
solution ϕ is Pareto efficient if it only assigns sets of Pareto efficient allocations.
Since all contracts are based on voluntary participation, at any allocation A ∈ A each
doctor who is assigned a contract Ad ∈ X can reject it and each hospital who is assigned a
set of contracts Ah 6= ∅ can reject some or all contracts in Ah. Thus, an allocation A ∈ A
is individually rational for matching market R ∈ R if for all d ∈ D, Ad Rd ∅ and for all
h ∈ H and X ′ ⊆ Ah, Ah Rh X
′. Alternatively, using the profile of choice correspondences
associated with R, A is individually rational if for all i ∈ N , Ci(A) = Ai or alternatively,
CD(A) = CH(A) = A. A solution ϕ is individually rational if it only assigns sets of
individually rational allocations.
2.4 Stability: Stable Matchings and Substitutable Preferences
As described in the Introduction, an important criterion for an allocation to be accepted as
final outcome in a job-matching market is stability. Consider a matching market R ∈ R.
First, since the matching markets we consider here are based on voluntary participa-
tion, a necessary condition for allocation A to be stable is individual rationality:
(IR) CD(A) = CH(A) = A.
Second, given that allocation A is individually rational, we assume that no hospital
can block allocation A together with a set of doctors, i.e., there is no alternative set of
contracts X ′ ∈ Xh that hospital h strictly prefers over Ah and that is weakly preferred by
the corresponding doctors, i.e., there is no hospital h and no set of contracts X ′ ∈ Xh such
that X ′ PhAh and for all doctors d ∈ D that are being offered a contract x
′
d with hospital
h (X ′ ∩Xd = {x
′
d} 6= ∅), x
′
dRdAd. Using the associated profile of choice correspondences,
no blocking of hospitals can be expressed as: there is no hospital h and no set of contracts
X ′ ∈ Xh such that Ch(A ∪ X
′) = X ′ and for all doctors d ∈ D that are being offered a
contract x′d with hospital h, Cd(A ∪X
′) = x′d. Note that for all doctors d ∈ D that are
not being offered a contract in X ′ (X ′ ∩Xd = ∅), by individual rationality, Cd(A ∪X
′) =
Ad. Thus,
⋃
d∈D Cd(A ∪ X
′) ⊇ X ′. Hence, we can formulate no blocking by hospitals
comprehensively as follows.
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(NB) There is no hospital h and set of contracts X ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ 6= Ch(A), such that
X ′ = Ch(A ∪X
′) ⊆ CD(A ∪X
′).
An allocation A ∈ A is stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no hospital can block
allocation A together with a set of doctors (NB). By S(R) ⊆ A we denote the set of stable
allocations for matching market R. It is a standard observation in matching theory that
stable allocations are at the same time core allocations in the sense that no coalition of
hospitals and doctors can find another allocation that contains contracts between members
of the coalition that they all weakly and some strictly prefer. Thus, similarly as in other
matching models, the core equals the set of stable matchings. The stable correspondence
S : R =⇒ A assigns to each matching market R the set of stable matchings S(R).
Note that for the general domain of matching markets specified so far stability is not
guaranteed, i.e., there may exist R ∈ R with S(R) = ∅ (see Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005, Theorem 5). Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) prove that the set of stable matchings is
non-empty if all hospitals’ preferences are substitutable; loosely speaking, a hospital has
substitutable preferences if it does not consider complementarities in the sets of contracts
it can offer. To be precise, the substitutable preference condition states that if a contract
is chosen by a hospital from some set of available contracts, then that contract is still
chosen by the hospital from a smaller set of available contracts that include it. Formally,
hospital h’s preferences Rh are substitutable if
(SUB) for the associated choice correspondence Ch and all sets of contracts
X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ ∩ Ch(Y
′) ⊆ Ch(X
′).
Equivalently one can formulate substitutability as follows (see Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005). If a contract is not chosen by a hospital from some set of available contracts,
then that contract is still not chosen by the hospital from a larger set of available con-
tracts. For any set of contracts X ′ ∈ Xh, NCh(X
′) := X ′\Ch(X
′) denotes the set of all
contracts that are not chosen from set X ′ by choice correspondence Ch. One can easily
prove that condition (SUB) is equivalent to the following condition (SUB’).
(SUB’) For all sets of contracts X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ∈ Xh, NCh(X
′) ⊆ NCh(Y
′).
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) showed that the set of stable matchings is non-empty if
hospitals’ preferences are substitutable. Since for our later results the non-emptiness of
the stable correspondence is important and substitutability is a reasonable assumption
for many matching markets, from now on the domain of substitutable preferences is our
reference domain.
Next, we illustrate how various well-known two-sided matching markets can be modeled
as matching with contracts markets.
2.5 Well-Known Matching with Contracts Markets
Example 1. One-To-One Matching or Marriage Markets
Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced one-to-one matching or marriage markets (see
also Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Part I). They demonstrated that stable matchings
for one-to-one matching markets always exist and at least one stable matching can be
calculated by using the (now) famous deferred acceptance algorithm.
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Using our matching with contracts framework, a one-to-one matching market consists
of D, H, and X = {(d, h) | d ∈ D and h ∈ H}. Each doctor d ∈ D has a total (linear)
order over Xd ∪ {∅} = {(d, h) |h ∈ H} ∪ {∅}. Each hospital h ∈ H has a total (linear)
order over the sets of feasible contracts Xh = {X
′ |X ′ ⊆ {(d, h) | d ∈ D}} that satisfies
the following restriction: for all X ′ ∈ Xh, |X
′| > 1, ∅ Ph X
′. Phrased differently, for all
X ′ ⊆ X, |Ch(X
′)| ≤ 1, i.e., from any set of contracts X ′ a hospital h either chooses the
null contract or exactly one contract in X ′ ∩ {(d, h) | d ∈ D}. Note that hospitals’ prefer-
ences as specified above are substitutable.
In the original model (Gale and Shapley, 1962) the set of feasible contracts per hos-
pital is restricted to at most one contract and hospitals’ preferences are defined as total
(linear) orders over {(d, h) | d ∈ D} ∪ {∅}. In view of results concerning stability it does
not matter whether one restricts the set of feasible contracts for hospitals or incorpo-
rates these restrictions into the hospitals’ individual rationality constraints through their
preferences. 
Example 2. Many-To-One Matching or College Admissions Markets
Gale and Shapley (1962) first introduced many-to-one matching or college admissions
markets. In their original model colleges are matched with sets of students, but colleges’
preferences are only defined over individual students and not over sets of students. The
college admissions problem where colleges have preferences over sets of students was first
presented by Roth (1985) (see also Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Part II). Roth (1985)
demonstrated that contrary to the general belief, many-to-one matching markets cannot
be reduced to one-to-one matching markets by reducing colleges’ preferences to preferences
over individual students. For instance, in contrast to one-to-one matching markets, stable
matchings may not exist for many-to-one matching markets.
Using our matching with contracts framework, a many-to-one matching market consists
of D, H, a quota vector q = (qh)h∈H (for all h ∈ H, qh > 0 is a positive integer that
represents the maximal number of doctors hospital h can hire) and X = {(d, h) | d ∈
D and h ∈ H}. Each doctor d ∈ D has a total (linear) order over Xd ∪ {∅} = {(d, h) |h ∈
H}∪{∅}. Each hospital h ∈ H has a total (linear) order over the sets of feasible contracts
Xh = {X
′ |X ′ ⊆ {(d, h) | d ∈ D}} that satisfies the following restriction: for all X ′ ∈ Xh,
|X ′| > qh, ∅PhX
′. Phrased differently, for all X ′ ⊆ X, |Ch(X
′)| ≤ qh, i.e., from any set of
contracts X ′ a hospital h chooses at most qh contracts in X
′∩{(d, h) | d ∈ D}. In addition,
in order to express that hospitals’ preferences over sets of doctors are linked in a plausible
way to their preferences over individual doctors, we assume that hospitals’ preferences are
responsive (see Roth, 1985): Let h ∈ H. Then, (i) for all X ′ ⊆ {(d, h) | d ∈ D}, |X ′| < qh,
and all (d′, h) 6∈ X ′, X ′ ∪ {(d′, h)} Ph X
′ if and only if {(d′, h)} Ph ∅ and (ii) for all
X ′ ⊆ {(d, h) | d ∈ D}, |X ′| < qh, and all (d
′, h), (d′′, h) 6∈ X ′, X ′∪{(d′, h)}PhX
′∪{(d′′, h)}
if and only if {(d′, h)} Ph {(d
′′, h)}. Note that if a hospital’s preferences are responsive
then they are also substitutable.
If for all h ∈ H, qh = 1, then the many-to-one and the one-to-one (see Example 1)
matching model coincide. Similarly as in Example 1, in view of results concerning stability
it does not matter whether one restricts the set of feasible contracts for hospitals by
their quotas or incorporates these restrictions into the hospitals’ individual rationality
constraints through their preferences. 
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Example 3. Many-To-One Matching with Wages or Job Matching Markets
In order to fit into the matching with contracts model, we discuss a discrete version
without ties of Kelso and Crawford’s (1982) job matching model. (Note that in Kelso
and Crawford’s (1982) original (discrete or continuous) model, ties between contracts are
allowed.)
A many-to-one matching market with wages consists of D, H, a discrete set of wages
W ⊂ R+, X ⊂ D × H ×W , and corresponding projections µD and µH on D and H,
respectively. We assume that W is such that agents have strict preferences. Each doctor
d ∈ D has a total (linear) order over Xd∪{∅} = {(d, h, w) ∈ X |h ∈ H,w ∈W}∪{∅} such
that for two contracts (d, h, w) and (d, h, w′), doctor d (strictly) prefers (d, h, w) to (d, h, w ′)
if and only if w > w′. By w(d,h) we denote the smallest wage at which doctor d (strictly)
prefers to work at hospital h over being unemployed, denoted by ∅. Each hospital h ∈ H
has a total (linear) order over the sets of feasible contracts Xh = {X
′ ⊆ µ−1H (h) | for all d ∈
D, |X ′∩µ−1D (d)| ≤ 1} that are based on a “production” function Y
h satisfying the following
properties: (i) for all D′ ⊆ D, Y h(D′) ∈ R+ represents the productivity (in monetary
terms) of the set of doctors D′ when employed together at hospital h, (ii) Y h(∅) = 0 (no
free lunch), and (iii) for all D′ ⊆ D\{d′}, Y h(D′ ∪ d′) − Y h(D′) ≥ w(d′ ,h). Without the
last assumption a hospital could always employ a doctor at zero wage if his/her marginal
product were less than his/her minimal wage. Assumption (iii) implies that in a Kelso and
Crawford job matching market there are no unemployed doctors (at least not at a stable
allocation), since hiring one more doctor at minimal wage always benefits the hospital.
Finally, hospital h (strictly) prefers
⋃
d∈D′(d, h, w
′
d) ∈ Xh to
⋃
d∈D′′(d, h, w
′
d) ∈ Xh if
and only if Y h(D′) −
∑
d∈D′ wd > Y
h(D′′) −
∑
d∈D′′ wd. Hatfield and Milgrom (2005,
Theorem 2) show that Kelso and Crawford’s “gross-substitutability” condition implies
substitutability of hospitals’ preferences. 
Example 4. Auction Markets
A matching market with contracts can be interpreted as an auction market if there is
only one hospital (the auctioneer) which auctions off a set of (real or abstract) objects.
A contract for such a matching market specifies the set of objects an agent obtains at
which price. We refer to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) for further examples and references
concerning the connection between matching with contracts and auctions. 
3 Monotonicity and Nash Implementation
So far we have described all ingredients for the implementation environment, which is given
by the set of agents N , the set of alternatives (allocations) A, and the set of preference
profiles R. Before focusing on the Nash implementability of the stable correspondence,
we focus on a necessary condition for Nash implementability (Maskin, 1999) that in itself
has a normative appeal: (Maskin) monotonicity.
3.1 Monotonicity
Before introducing monotonicity, we need some standard terms and notation. For any
agent i ∈ N , preference relation Ri ∈ Ri, and allocation A ∈ A, the lower contour set of
Ri at A is Li(A,Ri) := {A
′ ∈ A|ARi A
′}.
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Next, we define monotonic transformations. Loosely speaking, for any allocation A
and any preference profile R, if at a preference profile R′ all agents i ∈ N consider their
allotment Ai to be (weakly) better, then R
′ is a monotonic transformation of R at A.
Formally, for preference profiles R,R′ ∈ R and allocation A ∈ A, R′ is a monotonic
transformation of R at A if for all i ∈ N , Li(A,Ri) ⊆ Li(A,R
′
i). By MT (A,R) we
denote the set of all monotonic transformations of R at A. For agent i ∈ N , preference
relation R′i ∈ Ri, and preference profile R ∈ R, we obtain preference profile (R
′
i, R−i) by
replacing Ri at R by R
′
i. By MTi(A,R) we denote the set of all unilateral monotonic
transformations of R at A, i.e., monotonic transformations of R at A of the specific form
(R′i, R−i).
A solution ϕ is monotonic if an allocation A that is chosen at preference profile R is
also chosen at a preference profile R′ where A is considered (weakly) better by all agents.
Formally, a solution ϕ is monotonic if for all preference profiles R,R ′ ∈ R, A ∈ ϕ(R) and
R′ ∈ MT (A,R) imply A ∈ ϕ(R′). As discussed in the next subsection, monotonicity is
one of the key concepts in implementation theory. Here, we first focus on the implication
that monotonicity has on solutions.
Assume that for a matching market R ∈ R, a given allocation A ∈ A and some set of
contracts X ′ ⊆ X, some agent j ∈ N considers the contract or the set of contracts Aj to
be optimal in A∪X ′, i.e., Cj(A∪X
′) = Aj. Then, Aj becoming even better according to
agent j’s preferences implies that Aj is still optimal for j. In other words, if Aj is chosen
from A ∪X ′ by agent j at the original preferences Rj , then Aj is still chosen by j after a
monotonic transformation of Rj. We summarize this useful fact in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let R ∈ R, j ∈ N , A ∈ A, and X ′ ⊆ X be such that Cj(A ∪X
′) = Aj. Then
for R′ ∈MTj(A,R) and agent j’s associated choice correspondence C
′
j, C
′
j(A∪X
′) = Aj.
Theorem 1. The stable correspondence S is monotonic.
Proof: Consider a matching market R ∈ R and a stable set of contracts A ∈ S(R). Let
R′ be a monotonic transformation of R at A, i.e., R′ ∈MT (A,R). Denote the associated
profile of choice correspondences for R′ by (C ′i)i∈N . In order to show that the stable
correspondence is monotonic, we need to show that A ∈ S(R′).
Unilateral monotonic transformations: First, assume that for some j ∈ N , R ′ ∈
MTj(A,R). Hence, for all i ∈ N\{j}, C
′
i = Ci.
Part (IR): First, we show that allocation A is individually rational at matching market
R′. Since A ∈ S(R), by (IR) Cj(A) = Aj . Thus, by Lemma 1, C
′
j(A) = Aj , and therefore,
C ′j(A) = Cj(A). Recall that for all i ∈ N , C
′
i(A) = Ci(A). Hence, A being individually
rational at R [(IR) CD(A) = CH(A) = A] implies that A is individually rational at R
′
[(IR) C ′D(A) = C
′
H(A) = A].
Part (NB): Next, we prove that (NB) holds for allocation A at matching market R ′.
Suppose, by contradiction, that (NB) does not hold after the monotonic transformation,
i.e., there exists a hospital h ∈ H and a set of contracts X ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ 6= C ′h(A), such that
X ′ = C ′h(A ∪X
′) ⊆ C ′D(A ∪X
′).
If j ∈ D, then (NB) for matching market R implies X ′ = Ch(A ∪X
′) 6⊆ CD(A ∪X
′).
Hence, since A ∈ A and X ′ ∈ Xh, agent j can at A∪X
′ choose contract Aj or the unique
contract x′j ∈ X
′ ∩ Xj , x
′
j 6= Aj . Since for all d ∈ D\{j}, Cd = C
′
d, X
′ ⊆ C ′D(A ∪ X
′)
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and X ′ 6⊆ CD(A ∪ X
′) imply C ′j(A ∪ X
′) = xj and Cj(A ∪ X
′) = Aj . This contradicts
Lemma 1.
Since condition (NB) does not involve any agent inH\{h}, it is clear that if j ∈ H, then
j = h. Now, (NB) for matching market R implies X ′ 6= Cj(A ∪X
′). If Cj(A ∪X
′) = Aj ,
then C ′j(A ∪ X
′) = X ′ contradicts Lemma 1. Hence, Cj(A ∪ X
′) = Y ′ ∈ Xj\{Aj , X
′}.
Since Y ′ ⊆ A ∪ X ′, Cj(A ∪ Y
′) = Y ′. Recall that our assumption that (NB) does not
hold for R′ implies X ′ (= C ′h(A ∪X
′)) ⊆ C ′D(A∪X
′). This means that each doctor d ∈ D
having to choose between two distinct contracts Ad ∈ A and x
′
d ∈ X
′ always chooses x′d.
Since Y ′ ⊆ A ∪ X ′, each doctor d ∈ D having to choose between two distinct contracts
Ad ∈ A and y
′
d ∈ Y
′ (hence y′d ∈ X
′) always chooses y′d. Thus, Y
′ ⊆ C ′D(A ∪ Y
′). To
summarize, there exists a hospital j and a set of contracts Y ′ ∈ Xh, Y
′ 6= Ch(A), such that
Y ′ = Ch(A∪ Y
′) ⊆ CD(A∪ Y
′). This contradicts the stability, namely condition (NB), of
allocation A in matching market R.
General monotonic transformations: So far we have shown that for all unilateral
monotonic transformations R′ ∈ MTj(A,R), A ∈ S(R
′). To extend this result to general
monotonic transformations, we simply apply the “unilateral monotonic transformation
step” iteratively for all agents i ∈ N .
Note that we did not use any restrictions on hospitals’ preferences in the proof of
Theorem 1. Hence, Theorem 1 is valid for the general preference domain, but also applies
to our standard domain of matching markets where hospitals always have substitutable
preferences. In addition, Theorem 1 is valid for any other non-empty preference domain
for which the stable correspondence is well-defined (i.e., non-empty).
Theorem 2. If solution ϕ is a Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic
correspondence, then ϕ ⊇ S, i.e., for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) ⊇ S(R).
We give a short outline of the proof of Theorem 2.
We start with a stable allocation A for matching market R. In Step 1 we change
doctors’ preferences at R and obtain a preference profile R′ ∈ R such that R is a monotonic
transformation of R′ (and vice versa). By Theorem 1, A is stable for matching market
R′. In Step 2 we change hospitals’ preferences at R′ and obtain a substitutable preference
profile R¯ such that R′ is a monotonic transformation of R¯. Then, R is also a monotonic
transformation of R¯. In Step 3 we show that A is stable for matching market R¯. In
Step 4 we identify A to be the only Pareto efficient and individual rational allocation for
matching market R¯. Hence, A ∈ ϕ(R¯). Finally, since ϕ is monotonic and R is a monotonic
transformation of R¯, A ∈ ϕ(R) (Step 5).
Proof: Let ϕ be a Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic correspondence.
Consider a matching market R ∈ R and a stable set of contracts A ∈ S(R). We need to
show that A ∈ ϕ(R).
Step 1: Transforming doctors’ preferences
Let D′ ⊆ D denote the set of doctors d′ for whom there exists a contract xd′ ∈ Xd′ with
Ad′ Pd′ xd′ Pd′ ∅.
For each doctor d′ ∈ D′ we define R′d′ by moving ∅ just below Ad′ while not changing
preferences over contracts in Xd′ , i.e., R
′
d′ is such that
(i) Ad′ P
′
d′ ∅,
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(ii) for no xˆd′ ∈ Xd′ , Ad′ P
′
d′ xˆd′ P
′
d′ ∅, and
(iii) for all x¯d′ , x˜d′ ∈ Xd′ , x¯d′ P
′
d′ x˜d′ if and only if x¯d′ Pd′ x˜d′ .
For all i ∈ N\D′, R′i := Ri. Hence, we obtain matching market R
′ from R by transforming
preferences of doctors d′ ∈ D′ according to (i)–(iii). Note that after transforming the
doctors’ preferences, hospitals’ preferences are still substitutable. Also, note that for all
i ∈ N , Li(A,R
′
i) = Li(A,Ri). Hence, R is a monotonic transformation of R
′ at A and
R′ is a monotonic transformation of R at A. By Theorem 1 and R′ ∈ MT (A,R), A is a
stable allocation for matching market R′, i.e., A ∈ S(R′). Particularly, A is individually
rational for matching market R′.
Step 2: Transforming hospitals’ preferences
Recall that for all h ∈ H, R′h = Rh. To simplify notation, we will use for all h ∈ H, Ch
instead of C ′h.
Let Hˆ ⊆ H denote the set of hospitals hˆ for which there exists a contract x
hˆ
, {x
hˆ
} ∈ X
hˆ
,
and a set of contracts Y ∈ X
hˆ
with C
hˆ
(A ∪ {x
hˆ
}) = A
hˆ
and
(
Y ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
P
hˆ
Y . For any x
hˆ
such that C
hˆ
(A ∪ {x
hˆ
}) = A
hˆ
define Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
) := {Y ∈ X
hˆ
|
(
Y ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
P
hˆ
Y }.
For each hospital hˆ ∈ Hˆ we fix some contract x
hˆ
such that C
hˆ
(A ∪ {x
hˆ
}) = A
hˆ
and
Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
) 6= ∅. Then, define Rˆ
hˆ
as follows. For all Y ∈ Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
) we move Y just above
Y ∪ {x
hˆ
} while not changing preferences over sets of contracts in X
hˆ
\Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
), i.e., Rˆ
hˆ
is such that for all Y ∈ Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
),
(i) Y Pˆ
hˆ
(
Y ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
,
(ii) for no Z ∈ X
hˆ
, Y Pˆ
hˆ
Z Pˆ
hˆ
Y ∪ {x
hˆ
}, and
(iii) for all Z¯
hˆ
, Z˜
hˆ
∈ X
hˆ
\Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
), Z¯
hˆ
Pˆ
hˆ
Z˜
hˆ
if and only if Z¯
hˆ
P
hˆ
Z˜
hˆ
.
Denote the associated choice correspondence for hˆ ∈ Hˆ at Rˆ by Cˆ
hˆ
. Before proving
substitutability of Rˆ
hˆ
, we prove the following property of Cˆ
hˆ
. For all Z ∈ X
hˆ
,
(a) Cˆ
hˆ
(Z) = C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
})\{x
hˆ
},
which means that the set of chosen contracts at the new preference relation Rˆ
hˆ
is obtained
from the set of chosen contracts at the original preference relation R ′
hˆ
(= R
hˆ
) by deleting
contract x
hˆ
(in case x
hˆ
was chosen).
Step 2.1: Proof of (a)
If x
hˆ
6∈ C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}), then C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) ⊆ Z and C
hˆ
(Z) = C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}). Furthermore,
x
hˆ
6∈ C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) implies that C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) ∈ X
hˆ
\Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
). Then, (ii) and (iii) in
the definition of Rˆ
hˆ
imply that Cˆ
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) = C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}). Since Cˆ
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) ⊆ Z,
Cˆ
hˆ
(Z) = Cˆ
hˆ
(Z∪{x
hˆ
}). Thus, Cˆ
hˆ
(Z) = Cˆ
hˆ
(Z∪{x
hˆ
}) = C
hˆ
(Z∪{x
hˆ
}) = C
hˆ
(Z∪{x
hˆ
})\{x
hˆ
}.
If x
hˆ
∈ C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}), then C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
})\{x
hˆ
} ∈ Y(x
hˆ
, R
hˆ
). This together with (ii)
and (iii) in the definition of Rˆ
hˆ
implies that Cˆ
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) = C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
})\{x
hˆ
}. Since
Cˆ
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}) ⊆ Z, Cˆ
hˆ
(Z) = Cˆ
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
}). Thus, Cˆ
hˆ
(Z) = C
hˆ
(Z ∪ {x
hˆ
})\{x
hˆ
}.
Step 2.2: Proof of Substitutability
Recall that since preferences Rh are substitutable, we have for all h ∈ H,
(SUB) for all X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ ∩Ch(Y
′) ⊆ Ch(X
′).
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We have to show that for all hˆ ∈ Hˆ,
(ŜUB) for all X ′′ ⊆ Y ′′ ∈ X
hˆ
, X ′′ ∩ Cˆ
hˆ
(Y ′′) ⊆ Cˆ
hˆ
(X ′′).
Let hˆ ∈ Hˆ and X ′′ ⊆ Y ′′ ∈ X
hˆ
. Consider X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ∈ X
hˆ
such that X ′ ≡
(
X ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
and
Y ′ ≡
(
Y ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
. Then we have
X ′ ∩ C
hˆ
(Y ′)
(SUB)
⊆ C
hˆ
(X ′)
⇒
(
X ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
∩ C
hˆ
(
Y ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
⊆ C
hˆ
(
X ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
⇒
[
(X ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}) ∩ C
hˆ
(Y ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
})
]
\{x
hˆ
} ⊆ C
hˆ
(
X ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
\{x
hˆ
}
⇒ X ′′ ∩
[
C
hˆ
(Y ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
})
]
\{x
hˆ
} ⊆ C
hˆ
(
X ′′ ∪ {x
hˆ
}
)
\{x
hˆ
}
(a)
⇒ X ′′ ∩ Cˆ
hˆ
(Y ′′) ⊆ Cˆ
hˆ
(X ′′),
which shows ̂(SUB). For all i ∈ N\Hˆ , Rˆi := R
′
i. Hence, we obtain matching market
Rˆ from R′ by transforming preferences of hospitals hˆ ∈ Hˆ according to (i)–(iii). We
have shown that hospitals’ preferences are still substitutable after the transformation.
Also, note that for all i ∈ N\Hˆ , Li(A, Rˆi) = Li(A,R
′
i) and for all hˆ ∈ Hˆ, Lhˆ(A, Rˆhˆ) ⊆
L
hˆ
(A,R′
hˆ
). Hence, R′ is a monotonic transformation of Rˆ at A. Since R is a monotonic
transformation of R′ at A, it follows that R is a monotonic transformation of Rˆ at A.
Finally, for all i ∈ N , Ci(A) = Cˆi(A) = Ai. Thus, CˆD(A) = CˆH(A) = A and A is
individually rational for matching market Rˆ.
We repeat the transformation of hospitals’ preferences as long as there exists a hospital
h˜, a contract xh˜, {xh˜} ∈ Xh˜, and a set of contracts Y ∈ Xh˜ with Ch˜(A ∪ {xh˜}) = Ah˜ and(
Y ∪ {x
h˜
}
)
P
h˜
Y . Note that this process stops after finitely many iterations since the
number of contracts x
h˜
such that there exists Y ∈ X
h˜
with C
h˜
(A ∪ {x
h˜
}) = A
h˜
and(
Y ∪ {x
h˜
}
)
P
h˜
Y decreases by one in each iteration.
Step 2.3: Matching Market R¯
Finally, the transformation of agents’ preferences results in a matching market R¯ and
an associated profile of choice correspondences (C¯i)i∈N . Recall that doctors’ preferences
at R¯ are the same as in R′. The properties of Rˆ in each iteration induce that at R¯
hospitals’ preferences are substitutable, R is a monotonic transformation of R¯ at A, and
C¯D(A) = C¯H(A) = A, i.e., A is individually rational for matching market R¯. Furthermore,
for all hospitals h¯ and contracts xh¯ ∈ Xh¯ such that Ch¯(A ∪ {xh¯}) = Ah¯, we have that
(b) for all Y ∈ Xh¯ such that xh¯ 6∈ Y , Y P¯h¯ (Y ∪ {xh¯}).
Next we prove A is a stable allocation for matching market R¯.
Step 3: Proof that A ∈ S(R¯)
Suppose, by contradiction, that A 6∈ S(R¯). Then, there exists a hospital h¯ and a set of
contracts X¯ ∈ Xh¯, X¯ 6= C¯h¯(A), such that X¯ = C¯h¯(A ∪ X¯) ⊆ C¯D(A ∪ X¯). Since, C¯D(A ∪
X¯) = CD(A ∪ X¯), X¯ ⊆ CD(A ∪ X¯) (recall how doctors’ preferences were transformed).
Thus, A ∈ S(R) implies X¯ 6= Ch¯(A ∪ X¯) = A. Hence, for some d¯ ∈ D and x¯d¯ ∈ X¯\A,
x¯d¯ P¯d¯ Ad¯. By the stability of A at matching market R, Ch¯(A ∪ {x¯d¯}) = Ah¯. Hence, for
X¯h¯ ∈ Xh¯ by (b),
(
X¯h¯\{x¯d¯}
)
P¯h¯ X¯h¯. Since
(
X¯h¯\{x¯d¯}
)
⊆
(
Ah¯ ∪ X¯h¯
)
, this constitutes a
contradiction to C¯h¯(A ∪ X¯) = X¯. Hence, A ∈ S(R¯).
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Since A ∈ S(R¯), it follows that A is Pareto efficient for matching market R¯. Next, we
show that allocation A is the only Pareto efficient and individually rational allocation for
matching market R¯.
Step 4: Proof that A is uniquely Pareto efficient and individually rational for R¯
Suppose, by contradiction, that A¯ ∈ A, A¯ 6= A, is Pareto efficient and individually rational
for matching market R¯.
Suppose there exists d¯ ∈ D such that A¯d¯ P¯d¯ Ad¯. By the transformation of doctors’
preferences, A¯d¯ Pd¯Ad¯ and A¯d¯ 6= ∅. Let h¯ be the hospital corresponding to A¯d¯. Then, since
A ∈ S(R), Ch¯(A ∪ A¯d¯) = Ah¯ and by (b),
(
A¯h¯\{A¯d¯}
)
P¯h¯ A¯h¯. Thus, in contradiction to
individual rationality of A¯ for h¯ at matching market R¯, C¯h¯(A¯) 6= A¯h¯. Hence, for all d ∈ D,
Ad R¯d A¯d.
Suppose there exists h¯ ∈ H such that A¯h¯ P¯h¯ Ah¯. Since A ∈ S(R¯), there exists d¯ ∈ D
such that A¯d¯ ∈ A¯ and Ad¯ P¯d¯ A¯d¯. Thus, by the transformation of doctors’ preferences
∅ R¯d¯ A¯d¯. If ∅ P¯d¯ A¯d¯, then we have an immediate contradiction to individual rationality of
A¯ for d¯ at matching market R¯. Hence, for all d ∈ D¯ such that A¯d¯ ∈ A¯ and Ad P¯d A¯d,
A¯d¯ = ∅. Then, for all d ∈ D¯ such that A¯d¯ ∈ A¯ and A¯d¯ 6= ∅, A¯d R¯d Ad. This, together with
A¯h¯ P¯h¯ Ah¯, constitutes a contradiction to the stability of A¯ at matching market R¯. Hence,
for all h ∈ H, Ah R¯h A¯h.
To summarize, for all i ∈ N , Ai R¯i A¯i. Since A 6= A¯, for some j ∈ N , Aj P¯j A¯j . These
facts establish a contradiction to the assumption that A¯ is Pareto efficient.
Step 5: A ∈ ϕ(R)
Since A is the unique individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation for matching
market R¯ it follows that ϕ(R¯) = {A}. Finally, since ϕ is a monotonic solution and R is a
monotonic transformation of R¯ at A, A ∈ ϕ(R).
Note that in the proof of Theorem 2 we assume hospitals’ preferences to be substi-
tutable. Not assuming any restrictions on hospitals’ preferences would in fact simplify the
proof considerably since in the construction of preference profile Rˆ (and finally R¯) in the
proof of Theorem 2 special care has to be taken to guarantee that hospitals’ preferences
at Rˆ (and finally R¯) are again substitutable.
In addition, Theorem 2 is valid for any other non-empty preference domain for which
the stable correspondence is well-defined and for which the domain is closed with respect
to the monotonic transformations needed in the proof: for instance, for college admissions
problems as discussed in Example 2, Kara and So¨nmez (1997) prove the equivalent of
Theorem 2 for the domain of responsive preferences that is a strict subdomain of the
domain of substitutable preferences.
An immediate implication of Theorem 2 is that no strict selection from the stable corre-
spondence is monotonic.
Corollary 1. Let ϕ ⊆ S, i.e., for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) ⊆ S(R). If ϕ is monotonic, then
ϕ = S.
Particularly, the well-defined (see Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005, Theorem 4) correspon-
dence that always chooses the stable allocation that is most preferred by the doctors
(alternatively, the correspondence that always chooses the stable allocation that is most
preferred by the hospitals) is not monotonic and therefore not Nash implementable. Next,
one can ask how to extend a non-monotonic correspondence in such a way that it becomes
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monotonic. Following Sen (1995) and Thomson (1999), we define the minimal monotonic
extension of any correspondence ψ as the smallest monotonic correspondence containing
ψ, i.e.,
mme(ψ) ≡
⋂
{φ | ψ ⊆ φ, where φ is monotonic}.
Hence, another implication of Theorem 2 is that the stable correspondence is the minimal
monotonic extension of any of its subcorrespondences.
3.2 Nash Implementation
A mechanism (for the described implementation environment) is a pair (M, g), where
M :=
∏
i∈N Mi denotes a set of message or strategy profiles and g : M −→ A the so-called
outcome function. The outcome function assigns to each strategy profile an allocation in
A. Since g contains all relevant information, we identify a mechanism with its outcome
function. A mechanism g together with a preference profile R induces a non-cooperative
game in strategic form, denoted by Γ(g,R), as follows. Each strategy profile m ∈ M
is mapped to an allocation g(m) ∈ A. These outcomes of the game are then evaluated
using the agents’ preferences at R. Note that the fact that preferences in our context are
ordinal does not limit the game theoretical analysis: either use ordinal preferences at R
to compare outcomes or choose a utility representation u : A −→ Rn (n = |N |) of agents’
preferences at R and define the payoffs for Γ(g,R) by the composition u ◦ g : M −→ A.
Mechanism g Nash implements solution ϕ if for all R ∈ R we obtain g(NE(Γ(g,R))) =
ϕ(R), where NE(·) denotes the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Hence, for a given
preference profile R and any allocation A ∈ ϕ(R) there is a Nash equilibrium of the
induced game Γ(g,R), the outcome of which is A. Conversely, the outcome of any Nash
equilibrium of Γ(g,R) belongs to ϕ(R). We say that a solution ϕ is Nash implementable,
if there exists a mechanism that Nash implements it.
Loosely speaking, a mechanism g describes a list of rules for a game in strategic form.
These rules are independent of the true preference profile. Then, for any possible set of
agents, represented by their preference profile R, any (desired) allocation in ϕ(R) can be
achieved by strategic interaction in equilibrium, thus can be obtained in a non-cooperative
fashion.
Maskin (1977, 1999) showed that a Nash implementable solution necessarily has to
be monotonic. However, monotonicity is not a sufficient condition for implementability.
Moore and Repullo (1990) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash imple-
mentability of a solution. We show that the stable correspondence does satisfy this condi-
tion and hence can be implemented by a version of Maskin’s (1999) mechanism (see Moore
and Repullo, 1990, Appendix).
For any agent i ∈ N , matching market R ∈ R, and subset A′ ⊆ A of allocations
let Bi(A
′, R) denote the set of “best allocations for agent i in A′ with respect to pref-
erence relation Ri”, i.e., Bi(A
′, R) := {A ∈ A′ |Ai Ri A
′
i for all A
′ ∈ A′} . Note that if
A ∈ Bi(A
′, R) and A′ ∈ A′ is such that Ai = A
′
i then A
′ ∈ Bi(A
′, R). That means that
all best allocations in Bi(A
′, R) specify the same (set of) contract(s) for agent i. Since
preferences are strict, A′ 6= ∅ implies Bi(A
′, R) 6= ∅.
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Definition 1. Condition µ in Moore and Repullo (1990)
A solution ϕ : R =⇒ A satisfies condition µ, if there exists a set B ⊆ A and for each
i ∈ N , R ∈ R and A ∈ ϕ(R) there is a set Ti(A,R) ⊆ B with A ∈ Bi(Ti(A,R), R) such
that for each R¯ ∈ R and j ∈ N the following three conditions are satisfied:
(µ1) A ∈
⋂
i∈N
Bi(Ti(A,R), R¯) implies A ∈ ϕ(R¯),
(µ2) A∗ ∈ Bj(Tj(A,R), R¯) ∩
⋂
i∈N\{j}
Bi(B, R¯) implies A
∗ ∈ ϕ(R¯),
(µ3) A∗ ∈
⋂
i∈N
Bi(B, R¯) implies A
∗ ∈ ϕ(R¯).
Moore and Repullo (1990, Theorem 1) show that in the presence of three or more agents
a solution ϕ is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies condition µ.
Theorem 3. If |N | ≥ 3, then the stable correspondence S is Nash implementable.
Proof: We show that the stable correspondence S satisfies condition µ (Definition 1),
given R ∈ R and A ∈ S(R), with B = A and Ti(A,R) = Li(A,Ri). Let R¯ ∈ R, (C¯)i∈N
be the associated profile of choice correspondences, and j ∈ N . Then, condition µ equals
(µ1) A ∈
⋂
i∈N
Bi(Li(A,Ri), R¯) implies A ∈ S(R¯),
(µ2) A∗ ∈ Bj(Lj(A,Rj), R¯) ∩
⋂
i∈N\{j}
Bi(A, R¯) implies A
∗ ∈ S(R¯),
(µ3) A∗ ∈
⋂
i∈N
Bi(A, R¯) implies A
∗ ∈ S(R¯).
Step 1: S satisfies condition (µ1)
Note that by the strictness of agents’ preferences the following statements are equivalent
(i) A ∈
⋂
i∈N
Bi(Li(A,Ri), R¯),
(ii) {A} =
⋂
i∈N
Bi(Li(A,Ri), R¯),
(iii) R¯ ∈MT (A,R).
Hence, condition (µ1) is equivalent to monotonicity (see also Moore and Repullo, 1990).
Thus, Theorem 1 implies that S satisfies condition (µ1).
Step 2: A∗ ∈ Bi(A, R¯) implies for all X
′ ⊆ X, C¯i(X
′ ∪A∗) = C¯i(A
∗) = A∗i
Let A∗ ∈ Bi(A, R¯). Since Bi(A, R¯) denotes the set of best allocations for agent i among
all possible allocations A with respect to preference relation R¯i, agent i must receive the
best possible (set of) contract(s) in X. Hence, C¯i(X) = C¯i(A
∗) = A∗i and for all X
′ ⊆ X,
C¯i(X
′ ∪A∗) = C¯i(A
∗).
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Step 3: A∗ ∈ Bi(Li(A,Ri), R¯) implies C¯i(A
∗) = A∗i
Let i = d ∈ D and A∗ ∈ Bd(Ld(A,Rd), R¯). Let A
′ ∈ A be such that A′d = ∅ and for all
i ∈ N\{d}, A′i = A
∗
i . Then, A ∈ S(R) (IR) implies that Ad Rd ∅ and A
′ ∈ Ld(A,Rd).
Thus, since A∗ is a best allocation for doctor d in Ld(A,Rd) with respect to preference
relation R¯d, either A
∗
dP¯d∅ or A
∗
d = ∅. Thus, C¯d(A
∗) = A∗d.
Let i = h ∈ H and A∗ ∈ Bh(Lh(A,Rh), R¯). Let X
′ ⊆ Ah and A
′ ∈ A be such that
A′h = X
′ and for all i ∈ N\{h}, A′i = A
∗
i . Then, A ∈ S(R) (IR) implies that Ah Rh X
′
and A′ ∈ Lh(A,Rh). Thus, since A
∗ is a best allocation for hospital h in Lh(A,Rh) with
respect to preference relation R¯h, either A
∗
hP¯hX
′ or A∗d = X
′. Thus, C¯d(A
∗) = A∗d.
Step 4: The assumptions in (µ2) as well as the assumptions in (µ3) imply (IR), i.e.,
C¯D(A
∗) = C¯H(A
∗) = A∗
Let A∗ be either as required in (µ2) or (µ3). Hence, for all i ∈ N either A∗ ∈ Bi(A, R¯) or
A∗ ∈ Bi(Li(A,Ri), R¯). By Steps 2 and 3, for all i ∈ N , C¯i(A
∗) = A∗i . Hence C¯D(A
∗) =
C¯H(A
∗) = A∗ and A∗ satisfies (IR) in the definition of stability.
Step 5: The assumptions in (µ2) as well as the assumptions in (µ3) imply (NB), i.e.,
there is no hospital h and set of contracts X ′ ∈ Xh, X
′ 6= C¯h(A
∗), such that X ′ =
C¯h(A
∗ ∪X ′) ⊆ C¯D(A
∗ ∪X ′)
Let A∗ be either as required in (µ2) or (µ3). Let h ∈ H be such that A∗ ∈ Bh(A, R¯) and
X ′ ∈ Xh with X
′ 6= C¯h(A
∗) such that X ′ = C¯h(A
∗ ∪ X ′)[⊆ C¯D(A
∗ ∪ X ′)]. By Step 2,
C¯h(A
∗ ∪X ′) = C¯h(A
∗), which implies X ′ = C¯h(A
∗) – a contradiction.
Let h ∈ H such that A∗ ∈ Bh(Lh(A,Rh), R¯) and X
′ ∈ Xh with X
′ 6= C¯h(A
∗) such that
X ′ = C¯h(A
∗ ∪ X ′) ⊆ C¯D(A
∗ ∪X ′). Then, by Step 2, for all i ∈ N\{h}, C¯i(X
′ ∪ A∗) =
C¯i(A
∗) = A∗i . Thus, C¯D(A
∗ ∪ X ′) = C¯D(A
∗) = A∗h and therefore X
′ ⊆ A∗h. By Step 3,
C¯h(A
∗) = A∗h. Hence, C¯h(A
∗ ∪ X ′) = C¯h(A
∗) = A∗h, which implies X
′ = C¯h(A
∗) – a
contradiction.
Steps 4 and 5 together show A∗ ∈ S(R¯) given the assumptions in (µ2) or (µ3).
Two remarks on Theorem 3 are in order:
First, we did not use any restrictions on hospitals’ preferences in the proof of Theo-
rem 3. Similarly as before (Theorem 1) we used substitutability of hospitals’ preferences
only to guarantee the existence of stable matchings and Theorem 3 is valid for any other
non-empty preference domain for which the stable correspondence is well-defined.
Second, in the implementing mechanism g in Moore and Repullo (1990) the math-
ematical objects B and Ti(A,Ri) in Condition µ have an intuitive interpretation. The
allocations in B are exactly those that can result from strategic interaction in the mecha-
nism. For any A ∈ S(R) let m¯ be an equilibrium with g(m¯) = A. Then Ti(A,R) contains
those allocations that agent i can “enforce” by unilaterally deviating from m¯. Clearly,
with Ti(A,R) = Li(A,Ri), neither agent is willing to deviate. The fact that B can be set
to A shows that in the mechanism every allocation can be an outcome of the mechanism,
i.e., it can be achieved through strategic interaction.
Theorem 3 holds as long as there are at least three agents in the market. Let us briefly
turn to the case in which there is exactly one doctor and one hospital. Hence the matching
with contracts model is interpreted as choosing an appropriate contract between these two
agents. We get a negative implementation result as long as we consider the whole set of
possible preference profiles.
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Theorem 4. Suppose |D| = |H| = 1, then S(R) is the set of all Pareto efficient, individ-
ually rational allocations. Moreover, S is not Nash implementable.
Proof: The first statement directly follows from the stability conditions (IR) and (NB).
The set of allocations can be identified with X ∪ {∅} and each Ri consists of all strict
orderings over X ∪ {∅}. Substitutability is not a restriction in this case.
Note that S is not dictatorial4. Non-implementability of the stable correspondence
then follows from Theorem 1 in Maskin (1999) (see also Hurwicz and Schmeidler, 1978),
which states that in an environment with two agents and R containing all strict preference
profiles over A, a Pareto optimal solution ϕ that is Nash implementable necessarily has
to be dictatorial. Hence, as S is Pareto efficient and not dictatorial, it cannot be Nash
implementable.
Remark 1. Theorem 4 crucially relies on the fact that all strict preferences over allo-
cations are contained in R. However, in specific cases, one can obtain a positive imple-
mentation result for two agents. Suppose, for example, that R contains all preference
profiles, in which the empty contract is always ranked least by the doctor as well as by the
hospital. Thus, it is clear from the beginning that employment under any conditions is
better than staying unemployed: a so-called bad outcome exists. As noted above, the sta-
ble correspondence collects all Pareto efficient, individually rational allocations. It is easy
to see, that S(·) therefore satisfies “no veto power”, which states that allocations that are
maximal for n− 1 agents at profile R have to belong to S(R).5 Following Moore and Re-
pullo (1990), this implies a weaker condition called restricted veto power. Then, by Moore
and Repullo (1990, Corollary 3), restricted veto power in connection with the existence of
a bad outcome suffices to show that the stable correspondence is Nash implementable in
the two-agent case. To sum, although the two agents may be fully informed about each
other’s preferences this knowledge cannot credibly be shared with a third party, as long as
we have no restrictions on the set of possible preference profiles. However, if we can take
employment for granted, there is a mechanism that implements the stable correspondence,
which then achieves a Pareto efficient, individually rational allocation through strategic
interaction.
4 Conclusion
One of our main results is that (Theorem 3) in two-sided matching markets with contracts
and more than two agents the stable correspondence is Nash implementable. For two
agent markets implementability can no longer be established (Theorem 4). Furthermore,
we show that the stable correspondence is monotonic (Theorem 1) and minimal among all
monotonic, Pareto efficient and individually rational solutions (Theorem 2). As matching
markets with contracts comprise a large class of different types of matching markets (see
Examples 1-4) our results extend previous Nash implementability results in more specific
matching markets (e.g., Kara and So¨nmez, 1996, 1997, for the matching markets described
in Examples 1 and 2).
4A solution ϕ is dictatorial, if there exists i ∈ N such that for all R ∈ R, A ∈ ϕ(R) implies for all
A′ ∈ A, A Ri A
′.
5For all i ∈ N , R ∈ R, and A ∈ A, A ∈
T
j 6=i Bj(A, R) implies A ∈ S(R).
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An alternative approach to show implementability of the stable correspondence S is
to show that it satisfies essential monotonicity,6 which is a stronger condition than mono-
tonicity. We could then obtain implementability of the stable correspondence by using
Yamato’s (1992) Theorem 2, which states (in our context) that Nash implementability
and essential monotonicity are equivalent.
In contrast to Kara and So¨nmez (1996, 1997), So¨nmez (1996), or Ehlers (2004), who
rely on Yamato’s (1992) theorem, we apply Moore and Repullo’s (1990) condition µ (Defi-
nition 1). Thus, instead of emphasizing that the stable correspondence satisfies a stronger
version of monotonicity, we focus on a weak “no-veto power” property that the stable
correspondence satisfies and that together with monotonicity guarantees that stable allo-
cations can be achieved through strategic interaction.7
More precisely, in view of condition µ as used in the proof of Theorem 3, we can
interpret (µ2) in the following way. Suppose we have a stable allocation A at preference
profile R. After a change in preferences from R to R¯ there is an allocation A∗, which
is among the best possible allocation for all agents except agent j. Then, this property
alone is not sufficient to identify A∗ as a stable allocation at R¯, since agent j (say j ∈ D)
might prefer the empty contract to his contract in A∗ and is also able to enforce it. Since
A was a stable allocation (at R), the empty contracts clearly appears in Lj(A,Rj). So,
condition (µ2) says that agent j cannot veto against A∗, if he gets his best contract (at R¯)
from Lj(A,Rj) at R¯. In fact, none of the agents except agent j would want to block A
∗
and stability enables agent j in this situation to choose any contract he can enforce on his
own. Hence, we mainly need the individual rationality property of stable allocations to
satisfy (µ2). Condition (µ3) simply describes a unanimity condition stating that if there
is an allocation that is best for all agents, then this allocation should be chosen. Clearly,
such an allocation satisfies individual rationality and no-blocking. Thus, stability clearly
implies the unanimity principle stated in (µ3).
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